After a brief diversion, I’m returning to my series on SharePoint with RMS. This post finishes off the baseline considerations, although there’s a lot more to say. But at last, in this post, we’ve reached the point where we know that RMS thinks I’m cool – so now what? Or if you prefer, I’m taking a look at the RMS Use License that is typically embedded in Microsoft Office documents, or in other cases might be associated with a client’s machine.
The Use License that RMS issues acts like an offline enforcer of allowed rights. The rights granted by RMS and the duration they persist define what a user can do with their offline copy of RMS-protected content and how long they can continue to take those actions before they need to re-visit SharePoint and the RMS infrastructure in order to claim fresh rights. Since rights persistence is defined by the owner(s) of a SharePoint list, the impact of those settings should be well understood by any users that have this control.This post focuses on what a user can do offline once RMS has done its job, and the user’s experience once those rights expire, bringing the tension between valid offline access versus timely rights revocation to the fore.
You will notice I’m talking about offline access a lot here. When I say “offline” in reference to RMS-protected content, I mean the documents that have already been encrypted by RMS and decrypted/opened by a user. I say the files are offline because the original unencrypted content still resides in the SharePoint content database. Any edits that RMS allows a user to make to the offline content need to be saved back to SharePoint if they will persist over time. Continue reading “RMS Use Licenses, Offline Access and Rights Revocation with SharePoint 2010”
As this series of posts about SharePoint 2010 with Rights Management moves on, it moves further from SharePoint. In this post I’m describing the final steps in the RMS protection process, where RMS authenticates the requesting user and authorises actions with RMS-protected content.
In most configurations, RMS will rely on its internal AD Cache to reduce the number of LDAP queries for user attributes or Active Directory group membership. RMS typically queries this cache when users request a license. If RMS finds a matching e-mail address for a user, the allowed rights will be granted in a Use License, which will persist inside a document or on a user’s machine until the rights expire. LDAP queries are only issued if cached values don’t exist or if they have expired. After an LDAP query is issued, the response is used to process the immediate request and the values are stored in the AD Cache for later use.
Although this caching process should “just work” initially, there are a number of tiers where user information can fall out of sync. First and foremost, does the signed-on user have an e-mail address in Active Directory that matches the SharePoint User Information List? What happens if this e-mail address changes, or if it didn’t match initially? How can we invalidate stale AD Cache values? How long does the AD Cache persist? What’s in it? What needs to be considered when turning it off? In many cases the default AD Cache values will be suitable, but operational processes should be orchestrated with AD Cache settings in mind, whatever they may be. Cache invalidation processes should also be understood before they need to be invoked. I will explore these considerations in more detail here.
Continue reading “RMS AD Caching for SharePoint 2010 Users”
In the previous posts in this series about SharePoint 2010 with Rights Management, I’ve been looking at the user information requirements to successfully bridge gaps between SharePoint and RMS. In this post I will focus on a poorly documented RMS configuration requirement that is often overlooked and seems to cause many deployment headaches. This is the point of contact where SharePoint first requests RMS.
Continue reading “RMS Publishing Permissions for SharePoint 2010 Application Pool Identities”
In this series of posts on SharePoint with RMS, I’ve mostly focused on the ways things might go wrong if Active Directory data, User Profiles and User Information Lists are misaligned. Now, assuming SharePoint has a reliable Work E-mail value for a user, there are still a number of things that happen between the initiation of a request for RMS-protected content and interaction with it. In this post I will inspect a successful request for RMS-protected content from SharePoint 2010.
Continue reading “Inspecting an AD RMS Request from SharePoint 2010”
Continuing this series about the SharePoint 2010 IRM implementation, in this post I’ll keep looking at the Work E-mail Address attribute in the User Information List, but focus specifically on how the initial value in that field gets populated from different sources for different Authentication Provider Types. As with the fuller picture considered in the last post, this is a lot more complicated than anyone would expect at a glance, but it’s really the lynchpin of this functionality – thus the depth here.
Continue reading “How SharePoint 2010 Authentication Provider Types Alter the Initial Population of Work E-mail Address Values”
In the first part of this series about the SharePoint 2010 IRM implementation, I provided an overview of the technology and why we might use it to enhance SharePoint’s access controls. In this second article, I’ll look closely at the key piece of information that bridges the gap between SharePoint and a Rights Management Server – namely, a user’s e-mail address. RMS relies on a user’s e-mail address in this way outside of the SharePoint world as well; this is an RMS requirement. SharePoint’s implementation attempts to work with this, even though SharePoint doesn’t require a user to have an e-mail address for most things to work.
IRM support has been built in to SharePoint as a WSS (now Foundation) technology. WSS/Foundation don’t have a User Profile Service, so the e-mail address information that RMS requires needs to come from somewhere else. As we’ll see below, it wouldn’t be optimal to query Active Directory for that value whenever RMS-protected content is requested, so SharePoint uses the value it (hopefully) already has in the lowest common denominator (WSS/Foundation) user information container. As we’ll see, reliably populating and updating that information is less straight-forward than it would appear at a glance.
Continue reading “How SharePoint 2010 Finds and Updates a User’s Work E-mail Address”
In recent weeks Information Rights Management (IRM) protections for SharePoint 2013 have received a fair amount of attention, as IRM is now configurable per-tenant, which brings the capabilities to SharePoint Online, supported by Windows Azure Active Directory Rights Management (AADRM). This is great, and I’ll have more to say about these new technologies, but I feel there’s a fair amount of missing public information about the way it’s been working on-premises for many years, which will prove to be foundational for the new stuff. I won’t go back in time to MOSS 2007 to describe that support, but I believe the Classic Windows Authentication scenarios that I will describe for SharePoint 2010 are largely the same as in the earlier implementation.
This first post focuses on the relationships of a few apparently-distinct topics and the effects that these considerations have for a user accessing Rights Managed content in SharePoint 2010. Namely:
- How SharePoint publishes content with Rights Management protections using the User Information List’s Work E-mail value.
How that field gets initially loaded…
- If an entry is added to the User Information List when a user is granted access to a SharePoint Site Collection by name.
- If an entry is added to the User Information List when a user accesses a Site Collection for the first time, having been granted access by group or attribute previously.
- How each of these events vary if the user is authenticated with a SAML Claim, and how Claim Mappings for a SAML Claim Provider’s Trust Relationship can alter this experience.
How the User Information List’s Work E-mail value can change after the User Profile to SharePoint Quick or Full Synchronisation Timer Jobs have run.
- How the scope of users targeted by this timer job works by default.
- How the scope of users targeted by this timer job can be modified and the possible effects of choosing to make this change.
- How Active Directory Rights Management Server (AD RMS, or just RMS below) discovers and caches e-mail address values for a user.
- How changes to an Active Directory user’s mail attribute can have an impact on access to RMS-protected content in SharePoint.
As is no doubt evident already, this is complicated stuff, but in my view, quite necessary to understand if using RMS with SharePoint. These considerations become more important if e-mail addresses are fluid, or at scale, and especially critical if authenticating SharePoint with SAML Claims while using RMS. I’ve produced a process diagram to explain these variations in a single view, but first I will provide background details.
Continue reading “Protecting SharePoint 2010 with Information Rights Management”